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Abstract 
The study of superego and ideology within the context of bodily ego and skin as a 
psychic wrapping is vital to understanding the intersubjective aspects of those 
individuals who are living in a mal-attuned or extreme situation. This paper 
investigates superego’s will to dominate over the skin-ego to satisfy the id by itself 
and takes an intermediate position between id and external reality. The authors further 
attempt is to conceptualize superego formation in a skin model of ego development in 
a synthetic way and redefine ideology within the context of this conceptualization. 
The term Encapsulated Skin-Ego may explain how when the skin-ego is 
dysfunctional, a certain part of superego comes into being a psychic wrapping instead 
of the skin-ego and has left its developmental position. Consequently, the skin-ego 
takes refuge in the encapsulated skin-ego to be secure. In addition, ideology has a 
hegemonic character and wishes to control social symbols to continue its domination 
over people’s minds and bodies. Ideology tries to encapsulate the skin-ego and 
deprive it of natural sensations to lead it to an isolated corner ultimately to suppress 
the thinking ego. Two-case studies present the psychoanalytic application of the 
authors’ ideas.       
 
  
We have still very much to learn about the nature of that institution [the superego]. 
                                                                                    S. Freud, 1927/1961e, p. 159 
Introduction 
Seeing the mind on the mirror of the Freudian structural model has occupied the 
psychoanalysts’ brain beyond Sigmund Freud (1915/1961i, 1920/1961b, 1923/1961c, 
1933/1961g, 1938/1961h). Within this context, an ongoing debate has occurred over 
the origin of superego and especially in the case of ego-ideal and superego formation 
(Britton, 2003; Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1984; Fenichel, 1928, 1931; S. Freud, 
1927/1946; Jacobson, 1946; Kernberg, 1975; Klein, 1927/1975b, 1932/1975e, 
1933/1975c, 1935/1975a; Lacan, 1994; Sandler, 1960). The debate has mainly shown 
how the genesis of superego has increasingly captured the interest of psychoanalytic 
community. 
 
According to Lagache (as cited in Anzieu, 1987a, p. 423), Freud interchangeably used 
superego, ego ideal, and ideal ego to represent the superego. As a comparison 
between ego-ideal and ideal ego, Britton (2003) declared that the ideal-ego is an 
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“illusional perfect self” (p. 105), while ego-ideal depends on what superego wants the 
child to be. In addition, Lagache (as cited in Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973) 
comprehended the ideal ego in the context of narcissistic formulation and 
omnipotence, and identification with praiseworthy figures; further, Chasseguet-
Smirgel (1984) viewed ego-ideal as a tendency toward reinstating illusion while the 
(benign) superego helps encourage reality (p. 76).  
 
Investigating superego formation depends on the level of experiencing in the 
unconscious chosen by researchers. According to Hinshelwood (1997), three levels or 
layers are evident in the interpretation of the unconscious. The first layer interprets the 
level of repression and symbolization by considering Oedipal rivalry, for example, 
like Freud and classical psychoanalysis. The second layer understands the 
unconscious through pre-oedipal object-relations and in terms of primitive defense 
mechanisms such as Kleinian psychoanalysis. Finally, the third layer of understanding 
the unconscious is primal skin, which considers the skin as an apparatus of 
containment as explained, for example, by Bick (1964, 1968), Montagu (1978), and 
Anzieu (1979, 1984, 1990, 1995/2016). 
 
This paper selected the third layer of experiencing and understanding of the 
unconscious and called it the Skin Model of Ego Development (SMED) in 
psychoanalysis, which is the cornerstone of the study of this topic. This system of 
psychoanalytic thinking involves three characteristics. First, the origin of SMED goes 
back to Freud’s concept of bodily ego (S. Freud, 1923/1961c); therefore, for this 
model, the self is a “pre-individual psychic whole” (Anzieu, 1979, p. 23) and existed 
before the ego, which constructs through defining boundaries and limits later. Second, 
the SMED’s findings are based on observation of the infant-mother relationship 
(Bick, 1968). Finally, SMED focuses on the non-defensive functions of skin as a 
primary ego (Anzieu, 1987b). This way of beholding the skin gives an opportunity to 
the self to feel the sense of unity through the skin as a psychic envelope (Anzieu, 
1995/2016). In this topographical model of the mind, the skin is a psychic container 
and “in fact found to be in front of the psychic apparatus as a filter, as a screen, as an 
interfacing between external reality and internal reality” (Anzieu & Anzieu, 1985, p. 
43). As a result, the skin provides integration and characterizes SMED as a non-
dualistic approach that operates within the context of intersubjectivity (Lafrance, 
2013). 
 
The term ideology has multiple meanings in different disciplines, but in this paper, 
ideology is viewed through the lens of superego, ideal-ego, and ego-ideal formation. 
Moreover, ideology is considered a distorting illusion and “camera obscura” (Marx, 
1845/1998, p. 47) that tries to deceive and seduce people to join a certain ideological 
system (Kølvraa & Ifversen, 2017). Ideology gains control over the body/skin because 
the soma is the home of the psyche and subjectivity (Anzieu, 1995/2016). 
Consequently, ego strength can be perceived in the context of the boundaries of the 
body and its envelope, skin, which symbolizes social boundaries (Douglas, 1966), 
resulting in a mutual relationship between bodily ego and society. According to 
Broughton and Zahaykevich (1988), “the power and significance of ideology reside in 
its ability to penetrate silently into every aspect of human development” (p. 196). The 
nature of ideology is to serve as a defensive fortress that can reduce anxiety by 
producing handmade idols and a shared system of ideas (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1984). 
Indeed, ideology supplies a sharing space for transferring the omnipotent power to its 
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believers because “behind the ideology there is always a phantasy of narcissistic 
assumption” (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985, p. 49).  
 
Psychoanalysis as a critique of ideology (Barratt, 1985) and oppressive-
fundamentalist discourses try to reveal a route from the primary to the secondary 
process thinking: from magical thinking to realistic thought (Loewald, 1962/1980c, 
1978/1980b). In contrast, ideologic-oppressive systems attempt to disturb this process 
to govern the person’s mind through invisible cultural controls thereby producing 
confusion of the symbolic formation and generating an ideologic discourse in service 
of producing oppressed objects without independent thought or a harmonious identity. 
Additionally, ideological systems apply suggestion and brainwashing methods to gain 
control over minds in order to recreate a mythical ancient past and its idols (Britton, 
2002; Kernberg, 2003a, 2003b). 
 
The reader will realize how the authors will see classical terminology through a 
contemporary lens. This implies that what someone sees in the structural model’s 
mirror could not be a perception of contemporary human beings but only reflects 
them. Concerning this matter, for example, Britton (2003, p. 93) asserted that how 
Melanie Klein “was happier using the term the unconscious than the id”. Additionally, 
Klein applied the term self to refer to the entirety of the individual and considered ego 
as a part of self that calls these days subjective self.  
 
From a psycho-socio-political point of view, this paper views ideological systems as 
the generator of extreme limitation to normal ego development (Broughton & 
Zahaykevich, 1988) in order to pose a danger to ego independence (A. Freud, 
1937/1993). The limited milieu refers to the importance of sociopolitical context in a 
historical background where the individual sometimes lives in an extreme situation 
(Bettelheim, 1967) such as prison, war, and asylum. 
 
Upon reflection on superego formation within the context of SMED, this paper 
follows three essential theoretical lines: First, considering superego functioning within 
the context of domination and affect-regulation. Second, looking the superego through 
the SMED lens with a special emphasis on dysfunctional skin-ego and how superego 
can be re-understood within the framework of skin-ego and thinking ego (Anzieu, 
1995/2016). Finally, redefining ideology with the help of a new formulation of the 
relationship between superego, skin-ego and thinking ego.   
The Importance of the Paper and Method 
Sigmund Freud (1923/1961c) believed “the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego” (p. 
27), one which shows the primary process of thought. This means bodily sensations 
are important in forming the primary ego, and some key psychoanalysts thought about 
the SMED. Bick (1964, 1968) and Anzieu (1979, 1984, 1990, 1995/2016) developed 
their theories based on the Freudian term bodily ego. Anzieu (1979) recognized 
Winnicott (1945/1958) among those who supported the SMED because Winnicott 
accentuated “the visual signals” (p. 23) in reference to Winnicott’s (1971) quotation, 
“When I look I am seen, so I exist” (p. 114). Winnicott (1955) promoted “living in the 
body” (p. 264) and asserted that without a sense of embodiment, no sense of otherness 
is possible (Winnicott, 1963/1965a, 1971). 
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The concept of skin as a subjective boundary refers to the soma as a home for psyche 
(Winnicott, 1962/1965b). Good enough handling of the body and its needs facilitates 
developmental shifting from skin-ego to thinking ego in terms of personalization 
(Winnicott, 1962/1965b) and individualization (Anzieu, 1995/2016). Synthesizing 
Winnicott’s and Anzieu’s notions indicates that individuation (personalization) 
depends on a “tactile envelope, which is also an envelope of warmth, softness, and 
firm holding” (Anzieu, 1990, p. 65). Within this context, depersonalization is the 
outcome of a split between the psyche and soma, and it rises because of non-good-
handling (Anzieu, 1990, 1995/2016; Winnicott, 1962/1965b). There is a strong 
tendency for psychoanalysts to formulate an intermediate position that protects the 
self from mental pain, trauma and extreme situation. During depersonalization, the 
second skin operates following extreme frustration and tries to protect the individual 
through the second skin’s omnipotent phantasies and overusing some mental 
functions (Bick, 1968). Furthermore, Winnicott described transitional space “as the 
resting place of illusion” (in Rodman, 1987, p.123) and Rosenfeld (1950) considered 
confusion as intermediate stage between splitting and reintegration. Additionally, 
Freud (1938/1961h) suggested that the superego locates itself at a strategic position 
between the id and the external world to become an intermediate function. This fact 
draws authors’ attention to the role of superego as an intermediate agency which 
functions developmentally and pathologically. 
 
Following Atwood and Stolorow (1993) that emphasized on context as a generator of 
our hermeneutics, it is necessary to describe a little bit about the first author’s 
contextuality that as a clinical psychologist had an analysis with a Post-Kohutian 
analyst and as a psychoanalysis candidate is in a Freudian psychoanalysis. Both 
valuable experiences have encouraged him to build up his identity as a contemporary 
Freudian within the matrix of SMED through his Ph.D. dissertation under supervision 
of the second author. Thereupon, for authors, the outcome of depersonalization is the 
disturbance of the developmental line from skin-ego to thinking ego; thus, the 
dysfunctional skin-ego opens a space for an imaginary skin to occupy the key position 
instead of skin-ego to wrap the psyche, even transitionally. In other words, when the 
skin-ego does not function as an envelope it seeks another skin shelter or refuge as a 
halfway home. After searching psychological-psychoanalytical databases such as 
PsycINFO, PEP, Google Scholar, Science Direct and Humanities Source, the 
psychoanalytical study on a synthetic approach to superego formation, skin-ego and 
ideology with a focus on SMED has not been able to catch a significant attention. 
 
The paper plans to conceptualize this imaginary and defensive skin in order to 
understand the superego’s will to dominate over the skin-ego. Within this context, 
ideology will define into the matrix of SMED. For this purpose, the paper uses a 
qualitative method to shift from convergent thinking to divergent thinking through a 
fresh pair of eyes. It wishes to refer the gap in literature review and consequently re-
understanding the literature through two-case studies the first is based on a deep 
interview and its qualitative analysis, and the second is discussing a refugee 
experiences with the help of his written works, textual analysis.   
 
Towards a Synthetic Conceptualization of Skin-Ego    
To find common ground in the presence of the tower of Babel in the psychoanalytic 
discourse, Anzieu (1990) asserted that “…(it) is implicit in Freud: “the unconscious is 
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the body” (p. 43), accordingly, gathered id, body and unconscious in one place in 
harmonic way. The body-unconscious as a corporeal foundation cannot meet the 
external reality by itself and bodily ego as a forerunner faces reality at the surface or 
skin, like a tree trunk that develops from a pitch to bark and its bark is a shield against 
external stimuli. This bodily ego for growing and developing the thinking ego, 
subjective self, needs to attunement and containment within a relational atmosphere. 
In this sense, the self cannot find itself directly but needs to perceive itself with the 
help of some representations such as ideals and defense mechanisms and, resultantly, 
“The self arises as separate structure out of the relation between ego and superego, 
just as the superego arises out of the ego’s relation to the world” (Havens, 1986, p. 
370). 
 
The superego is rooted in its biological origins and involves “acoustic roots” (Freud, 
1923/1961c), such as parental rules, while ego is formed on its tactual experiences 
(Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 105). The ego envelops the psyche, and the two egos are the 
skin-ego and thinking ego (Anzieu, 1995/2016). Anzieu defined skin-ego as a first 
bodily-psychological organ that is in contact with the surrounding environment. 
Anzieu (1995/2016) listed the following eight non-defensive functions of the skin 
ego: (a) maintenance or holding (b) containment, (c) protection, (d) individuation (e) 
inter-sensoriality, (f) sexualization (g) libidinal recharging, and (h) inscription. Most 
important to the current revision of the present investigation is Anzieu’s formulation 
of an auto-immune activity as a ninth function for the skin-ego called “attacks against 
the skin-ego” (p. 114) or “the attacks on the psychical container” (Anzieu, 1995/2016, 
p. 14). This function follows a self-destructive manner and wishes to remove the self 
and sets up a state of “non-self” (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 115) in a pure thanatic way 
and in the opposite direction to the attachment drive (Unlink, 2008). 
  
Specifically, the skin-ego is a primary structure that will later be replaced by the 
thinking ego. After this replacement, the ego can think symbolically through two 
elements: (a) desire and (b) language. Besides, the thinking ego is close to the 
secondary process of thinking and operates symbolically in close relationship with 
language and consciousness (Anzieu, 1989, 195/2016). As a result, the basic 
assumption of Anzieu’s theory is clear: Without sensations, perception cannot exist. 
That having been said, thinking ego cannot be created without a normal development 
of skin-ego, “not touching is like not thinking” (Ulnik, 2008, p. 32), because the 
intersubjectivity depends upon recognizing an individual’s feelings, thoughts, and 
wills through the caregivers (Fonagy et al., 1995; Ogden, 1994). Deprivation of the 
ego of its tactual experiences results in a dysfunctional state of skin-ego. 
 
Anzieu. (1995/20160 explained how “archaic sadistic Superego” (p. 184) is activated 
from the initial development of language and begins to show itself in the position of 
the regulator of cognition and behavior. In other words, the superego has language 
structure and children learn it not only through words, but also rules related to 
acquisition of speech. (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 105). Further, superego can operate in 
two levels of functioning—benign and malignant, and utilizing only the superego 
cannot reflect the destructive and pathological aspect of the superego. It is necessary 
to say that the nature of (benign) superego suggests the “primary taboo on touching 
replaces the tactile wrapping as the essential anaclitic support for the Ego” (Anzieu, 
1995/2016, p. 105). Additionally, the abnormal superego disturbs the process of 
affect-cognition regulation and, consequently, the development of the symbolic 
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formation and language, and deviates the shifting from skin-ego to thinking ego. 
Superego, then, resulting from constructive identification can regulate affect 
effectively, but when it is the outcome of defective identification with mal-attuned 
parents, the superego cannot regulate the self and its affect (Krystal, 1988). In this 
sense, abnormal superego is anti-object-relational and originating from earliest 
dissociations and separated from ego functions (O’Shaughnessy, 1999). 
 
The question is then raised: How can the dysfunctional skin-ego disturb the function 
of the thinking ego in the presence of superego’s will to dominant? The answer comes 
back to the nature of superego formation and the SMED. In line with superego’s 
domination, Anna Freud (1937/1993) showed how the ego could be overwhelmed in 
dealing with id’s manifestation and found refuge in the superego. Subsequently, the 
ego under pressure of anxiety opens its gate to the superego’s troops and loses its 
independence “and [the ego] is reduced to the status of an instrument for the 
execution of the superego’s wishes” (pp. 111‒112). Moreover, Lacan (1988) helped to 
understand the role of the superego by noting that the superego wishes to govern the 
ego and to satisfy the id by itself. Further, in terms of the domineering nature of the 
superego, Anzieu (1995/2016) decided the id, ego, and superego are competing for 
superiority on the surface to be a psychic wrapping, and even the id tends “to offer 
itself too as a total wrapping” (p. 92). Considering this rivalry as a will to power, the 
failure of the skin-ego to provide a wrapping for the psyche ends in the sense of the 
discontinuity of the self (i.e., anxiety).  
 
In addition, within the context of SMED, it is important to clarify the differentiation 
between primal skin and second skin. Bick (1968) explained how the inadequate 
containing object pushes the infant to generate omnipotent phantasies to hold himself 
by another skin called second skin: 
 
Disturbance of the primal skin function can lead to the development of a “second-
skin” formation through which dependence on the object is replaced by a pseudo-
independence, by the inappropriate use of certain mental functions, or perhaps 
innate talents, for the purpose of creating a substitute for this skin container. (p. 
484) 
 
According to Bick (1968), there is a need for a containing object in case of 
experiencing the unintegrated state by the infant and it generates “a frantic search for 
an object” (p. 485). The authors think that this frantic search for the containing object 
in overwhelming states of mind opens the way for a defensive skin to provide 
continuity through projecting the entire of self into a capsule object. This capsule 
assumes that replaces itself as a protective skin/object and is related to abnormal 
superego. Anzieu (1995/2016) believes that the superego wishes to be dominant over 
the ego: “Superego tends to make itself coextensive with the whole surface of the Ego 
and to substitute itself for the latter as a psychical wrapping” (p. 92). Following Bick 
and Anzieu, the current investigation contends that the current conceptualization of 
the second skin in the matrix of the skin model of ego is confusing and misleading 
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because of its overlap with abnormal superego and dysfunctional skin-ego. The 
present paper recognizes that abnormal superego has desire to dominate over skin-ego 
to protect the individual from “transitory states of unintegration” (Bick, 1968, p.136) 
through building a psychic protective capsule against hurtful reality. The authors 
apply a new term, encapsulated-skin-ego to explain an isolative aspect of 
dysfunctional skin-ego that is separated, alienated and dissociated from emotional 
experiences.  
 
The encapsulated-skin-ego wishes to wrap its capsule closely about the dysfunctional 
skin-ego in order to be an alternative-imaginary skin to protect the self, although this 
protective function belongs to skin-ego developmentally (Anzieu, 1990). 
Encapsulated skin-ego succeeds in encapsulating the skin-ego through two types of 
imaginary defensive wrapping: 1) an encapsulation related to superego and its 
components and 2) an encapsulation related to overusing some skin-ego’s functions. 
The first one shows itself in identifying with authority figures (Lorenz, 1973) and 
defective identifications. Within this context, the individual wishes to use the 
imaginary skin of the object as a coat phantasmically that is more related to ego-ideal 
and its idealized objects, thus providing internal security for the vulnerable and fragile 
skin-ego. Moreover, taking refuge in the ideal ego and its illusional struggles to the 
reunion with the perfect-self and its omnipotent phantasies in order to regulate painful 
affects. This type of wrapping is more interconnected to the concept of second skin, it 
means unlike the previous type of wrapping the omnipotent self and its phantasies 
replace itself with dependence on the object.  
 
Furthermore, encapsulated skin-ego uses certain functions of skin-ego extremely to 
provide wrapping through current mental functions. In other words, to patch the sieve 
ego-skin a certain protective function of skin-ego overused by the individual. For 
example, imagine somebody who is addicted to massage to support his skin with the 
help of masseur’s hands. This overusing pattern creates a substitute for the first 
function of skin-ego, holding.  
 
In this sense, the encapsulated skin-ego as an imaginary skin is a thick and non-
sensitive skin which is created by filtering sensations to protect the dysfunctional ego 
from stimuli and, consequently, provides distorted mental functioning, in conclusion, 
it is strongly believed by authors that if you don’t touch and if you are not touched, 
you won’t be able to reach higher levels of language and thinking. Resultantly, it 
could be said the encapsulated skin-ego supplies the prohibition to touch not to define 
normal borders but to gain control over shifting from touching to thinking. For this 
reason, the encapsulated skin-ego builds a secure capsule for insecure self that cannot 
stay current home, i.e., dysfunctional skin-ego. This type of psychic-encapsulation is 
defensive and is not restricted to people with traumatic experiences, but everybody 
can use it to different degrees.  
Discussion 
If ideology were redefined in a dysfunctional system of skin-ego, one might 
reconsider ideology in the framework of the encapsulation of skin-ego with the 
manipulation of skin-ego functioning. Thus, for these authors, ideology as a mass 
production of depersonalization and the main outcome of second skin development 
can be redefined in the SMED and be revised under the umbrella of encapsulated 
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skin-ego formation. In this sense, the ideal-ego grandiosely gathers inside itself 
defective identifications, and the ego-ideal tries to reinstall an illusionary guideline in 
the face of disappointment (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1974,1984). Fleeing to the superego 
makes the wounded self be left unprotected, and the individual feels the gap between 
the ego and the ego-ideal painfully and perceives it as “a very deep wound” 
(Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1974, p. 352). This gap is experienced as a “defective 
identification” (p. 352) by the individual, and the gap blocks any sublimating attempt. 
In this way, the defective identification develops a pathological superego, and the 
constructive identification creates a developmental superego. 
 
A clear definition of ideology was not offered by Anzieu (1987b, 1990, 1995/2016); 
he simply referred to ideology in parentheses in trying to explain how patients fill an 
inner space through “the imaginary presence of an object or an ideal person” (Anzieu, 
1995/2016, p. 137). From a pathologic point of view, the superego sends auditory 
commands to deprive the skin-ego from touch and its tactile nature, presenting a 
double taboo on touching (p. 149). This deprivation can create the emptiness within 
the self, and the individual has to fill the gap by consuming ideologic figures. In the 
following discussion, an attempt is made to synthesize what was reviewed in order to 
define ideology within the context of an epidermal system of thought. One could 
argue that ideology with its hegemonic character (Boggs, 1984) and encapsulated 
skin-ego with its domineering nature constitutes a destructive twin to threaten the 
psyche’s integrity.  
 
Consequently, in a synthetic way (Anzieu, 1995/2016; Bick, 1964; Chasseguet-
Smirgel, 1974,1984; Winnicott, 1962/1965b), ideology is a defensive fusion of ideal-
ego (illusionary perfect-self) and ego-ideal with a dysfunctional skin-ego to wrap the 
discontinuity of the self with the help of the encapsulation as an alternative skin. This 
fusion is an outcome of the activated encapsulated skin-ego to regulate the self and its 
affects pathologically. In fact, it is a response to a disturbance of the primal skin’s 
functioning (Bick, 1964), de-personalizational states of mind (Winnicott, 
1962/1965b), or inner empty space of the self and the dysfunctional skin-ego (Anzieu, 
1995/2016). It means that the ideologic system tries to replace the defensive 
epidermal fusion with skin-ego to gain control over the sensory-motor gateway. 
Ideology wishes to inhibit the thinking ego or a secondary process thought on a 
cortical level (Anzieu, 1995/2016) in order to remove “individual critical power and 
moral sensibility” (Flugel, 1945, p. 182) and it means ideology wishes to removes or 
manipulates the developmental superego (Brainin & Teicher, 2015); consequently, 
implanting an idealized imaginary object instead of an actual object. The function of 
the idealized imaginary object is to satisfy the individual narcissistically when faced 
with external situations of frustration (Jacobson, 1946). 
 
Unlike the ideologic discourse and its hegemonic domination, Winnicott (1950) 
defined democracy in mutual relationship between society and its members, 
suggesting a democratic “society [is] well-adjusted to its healthy individual members” 
(p. 176). Furthermore, Winnicott believed that the individual who is “personally-
immature” and “prosocial but anti-individual” is obviously the one who governs an 
anti-democratic society (p. 178) or, as these authors view it, the idealized imaginary 
object. In other words, the idealized imaginary object as democratic discourse serves 
the same function for people as an attuned mother or caregiver does for the child. The 
mother or caregiver supplies an affect regulation and feeling of continuity or, in the 
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case of a mal-attuned caregiver, generates the feeling of discontinuity. For these 
authors, a democratic system prepares a containing environment for skin-ego and 
personalization. 
 
Using the idealized imaginary object and ideological teachings to fill the gap that 
emerges following self-discontinuity causes some disturbance, disturbing the process 
of thinking and language—the fundamental functions of the thinking ego (Anzieu, 
1990, 1995/2016). In the same way, the ego across the individual’s development 
forms word-presentation and speech and thinking in a more creative way (Anzieu, 
1995/2016). Loewald (1962/1980c) showed a missed link between the ideal-ego and 
primary narcissistic identification through “magical participation” (p. 47) in the world 
that is connected to the bodily origin of early language. Additionally, the earliest 
language experiences led to a magical power of words (Loewald, 1978/1980b). This 
magical usage of language encapsulates the individual and makes him more 
susceptible to projecting the ego-ideal onto an idealized leader, the idealized 
imaginary object who is prosocial but anti-individual (Winnicott, 1950). 
 
Filling the gap with the idealized leader or ideological teaching can prevent the 
individual’s collapse (Simmel, 1948) through using projection, idealization, and 
splitting (Kernberg, 2003a, 2003b; Summers, 2006). For these authors, ideology takes 
on this magical linguistical aspect of ego-ideal intentionally to dominate its discourse 
by putting emptied objects from any independent thought in the first line of defense 
against democratic discourse. Maybe because of this, ideological systems try to span 
the gap between skin-ego and thinking ego with the help of producing traumatic 
experiences, for example white torture. As Ferenczi (1933/1949) suggested, traumatic 
experiences disturb the capacity for symbolic representation, which is a required prior 
condition for developing language. 
 
Shifting from primary to secondary process thought (Freud, 1915/1961j, 1923/1961c) 
depends on normal development. The encapsulated skin-ego inhibits functions of 
skin-ego as a primary process and defines a distorted lens to see the external world in 
terms of “magical communication between” ego and reality (Loewald, 1951/1980a, p, 
19) in the secondary process. Ideology comes and uses this magical communication to 
gather omnipotent images as a false self-concept in terms of identity (Hollander, 
2006), which is illusionary and imaginary. In this sense, extreme situations 
(Bettelheim, 1943) and traumatic events (Stolorow, 2007) like prison, torture or 
asylum experiences dramatically recall the certain part of superego and dysfunctional 
skin-ego’s failures to play the epidermal role to protect the self instead of skin-ego. 
The first case study is of a young man who experienced prison and is explained from 
the SMED point of view. 
Case Study: Horror Room  
A young man with a history of prison experience accepted to participate in a deep 
interview with the first author by signing consent forms. The three sessions of the 
interview showed Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depersonalization 
symptoms, and psychosomatic symptoms due to physical torture and white torture. In 
addition, the interview considered his personality before prison, especially the 
positive parts of his character. One important symptom was psychosomatic symptoms 
involving losing weight and appetite at the beginning of his arrest and continued after 
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the prison by Gastrointestinal disturbance. The case family history demonstrates a 
calm atmosphere during childhood, and he found the house in which he spent his 
childhood secure and described how he started to stay home alone from age 12.  
Based on this paper’s aims, a short report of the interviewee’s experiences follows: 
 
When I was arrested by them, they sent me to solitary confinement, which was an 
isolated cell. Before the arrest, they explained you are under arrest on suspicion of 
collaboration with Group X which was a shock for me because I had serious 
ideological conflicts with that group and also any participation in mentioned group 
was a serious crime in my country. Following the shock and two intense 
interrogations my body reacted with nausea, loss of appetite and diarrhea and spent 
a week not eating anything and just drinking water and tea. I started to have hair 
loss consistently in enormous amount. After the somatic reactions, they started to 
give me some tablets under the pretext of treating my anxiety and medical 
condition. During the day, I was indifferent after taking pills, but during nights, I 
experienced a strange state of mind that was something between sleep and 
wakefulness I woke up in panic every morning. I started to refuse to take pills and 
put them on the back of my tongue or sometimes vomited after ingesting oral 
tablets. I had to collaborate with interrogators under pressure and threat of torture, 
but I told myself they cannot be your friends so do not trust their smile and do not 
be afraid them because “Black will take no other hue”. I had understood that I was 
going to lose my mind and I do not have any control over my thoughts. They 
threatened me with execution or imprisonment for life and said to me, “Your 
collaboration can reduce your sentence”. I felt a deep feeling of emptiness, and 
during that time, I waited to meet my interrogator impatiently maybe I can 
convince him that I am not guilty. 
 
One terrible memory that comes to my mind is one night I wanted to eat my 
dinner, but the prison guards called me they wanted to carry me to the interrogation 
room. We went downstairs to a dark basement where a horror room had been 
arranged to interrogate prisoners. A new interrogator asked me the earlier 
questions aggressively then started to hit me after he had turned off lights. 
Suddenly feelings of terror started running through my body and I felt my heart 
was about to stop. After a while, I found myself in prison’s medical service. I felt 
awfully bad—a deep feeling of being a toy in the hands of the interrogator as a 
broken individual.  
 
I should even make a confession that I had a reoccurring dream of an anonymous 
object which was believed to be a ghost by me approaching me along with my 
inability to move my body as if I had been paralyzed with fear and I need to even 
state that the closer that ghost was getting to me the more fears were being struck 
into my body and finally when that so-called ghost got close enough to touch my 
bed I would be awakened.  
 
About empowerment factors during prison, I used to take the longest showers so 
that I could feel more secure. Another refreshing factor was relationship with other 
prisoners especially after I was transferred to a cell shared with two other 
prisoners. They gave me spirit and wisdom to resist.  
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Placing a great deal of pressure on the interviewee did not meet their objectives and 
after three months of intensive interrogations he was bailed out from prison. He had 
the courage to pursue his dreams and finally immigrated to a country to study and 
work freely. The man obviously experienced attacking skin-ego to control thinking 
ego. In other words, the white torture was used to replace abnormal superego instead 
of the normal psychic wrapping to suffocate ideologically opposing voices. A 
psychoanalytic analysis of the man follows: 
 
• Breaking the borders of the body/skin by accusing him of being a member of 
Group called X which filled him with feeling of terror and insecurity, and the 
skin-ego felt helplessness that could not function to protect the body and 
psyche. 
• Semi-Sensory deprivation and prevention of any resistance to changing the 
deprival atmosphere (Mason & Brady, 2009) served to send the skin-ego into 
the isolated capsule like a sending into a skin cyst. 
• Cutting the relationship between the psyche and the soma in order to create 
depersonalization and empty space through giving unknown pills with 
psychological effects disrupted the border between sleep and wakefulness as a 
part of skin-ego’s envelope. 
• Producing terror and panic about being or not being alive for the victim and also 
sending to the horror room to break the last line of skin-ego’s resistance, all 
eight functions of skin-ego were broadly under attack. Panic attacks could be 
seen as a possibility of skin-ego’s collapse.  
• The helpless and dysfunctional skin-ego took refuge in the encapsulated skin-
ego. The encapsulated skin-ego came to protect him by identifying with the 
interrogator and satisfying his demands as a part of a hypnotic type of 
relationship, “addiction to illusional otherness” (Dorsey & Seegers, 1959, p. 
56). In addition, this process could be understood in terms of negative 
attachment, which refers to “the alliance of the attachment instinct with the self-
destructive instinct rather than with the self-preservative instinct” (Anzieu, 
1993, p. 45). Fortunately, he did not trust his interrogators and also never fought 
with them. A psychoanalytic explanation is he had a kind and stable father and a 
protective mother during childhood. It helped him not to accept their allegations 
and did not fall into the trap of negative attachment.  
• To continue, after prison, the panic attacks showed the ego loses its functioning 
when the encapsulated skin-ego envelopes and encapsulates the skin-ego. It 
appears when the skin-ego functions normally, and the role of the superego is 
going with the skin-ego developmentally in a normal situation. In extreme 
situations, the dysfunctional skin-ego recalls the malignant part of superego to 
help it, but the superego, in this new functioning, changes to a sort of non-
natural skin because the superego has to supply the skin-ego’s psychic 
wrapping, too. The encapsulated skin-ego never can be a psychic envelope in 
the long-term and needs some compensating backup. For example, in this case, 
psychosomatic symptoms were a part of a fruitless attempt to compensate the 
lost skin-ego’s functions through controlling fears with somatic pain. It could be 
said the soma tries to contain the trauma with psychosomatic symptoms 
painfully or as McDougall (1980) says “Pain is a bridge that spans psyche and 
soma” (p.421).  
• The dream of ghost refers to two facts: First, having near experience to skin-
ego’s collapse is very important factor that symbolize the integrator as an 
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intrusive ghost who entered his protective skin. In the disturbance of tactile 
wrapping of the skin-ego, the wrapping of dreams (Anzieu, 1995/2016) started 
to protect the psyche as a protective shield. Second, the dream shows after a 
long time the protective shield has not been repaired and Nocturnal panic 
attacks have stayed and had the permanent influence on ego functioning. The 
horror room penetrated the unprotected skin-ego by implanting panic ideas.  
·  
His immigration shows that the encapsulated skin-ego cannot suffocate the ego 
forever. A window of opportunity is needed to activate the linkage between skin-ego 
and thinking ego. It appears under the epidermal coverage of encapsulated skin-ego in 
a dictatorial manner, and the skin-ego continues to live in looking for an opportunity 
to come back to the previous functioning. As a matter of fact, the first author’s 
clinical experiences with refugees and traumatic cases have demonstrated that scars 
and injuries on the self and skin-ego need plenty of time to be cured. Any 
compensative over-activity such as substance abuse and gambling with a compulsive 
and self-destructive nature makes the cure process more difficult and challenging. The 
process of cure is depending on the capacity of analyst to bear primitive projective 
identifications of client to use therapist as an ancillary container skin. In other words, 
analyst needs to survive when client tries to live under their skin in symbiotic way and 
recognizes client’s intense fear of intimacy, individuation and separateness (Lothstein, 
2019) better understand the roots of client’s shame about seeing their defects of skin-
ego and being seen by analyst.  
Case Study: Boochani 
Another extreme situation that invoked the encapsulated skin-ego is the asylum 
experience. Behrouz Boochani (2018b) was an imprisoned refugee on Manus Island, a 
remote part of Papua New Guinea, for more than 6 years. In No Friend But the 
Mountains, he demonstrated how Manus Prison was created in the heart of 
contemporary democracy, where human beings are daily reduced to a number and 
receive psychological torture (2018a, 2018b, 2019). He painfully reported his feeling 
of depersonalization in the vicious circle of panic attacks: 
 
I imagine myself looking back from an unknown place beyond—myself looking 
back at me. I see a dead body, but with eyes still alert, struggling to survive. 
 
 In that moment everything is absurd/ 
 I search in my unconscious/ 
 For whatever shaped my existence/ 
 In the depths of my mind and soul/ 
 Or the ground/ 
 For belief in a god/ 
 Or a metaphysical force/ 
I don’t find anything at all (emphasis added)…I uncover nothing but myself 
and a sense of enormous absurdity and futility. 
(Boochani, 2018b, pp. 112-113) 
 
In an article for the Persian BBC, Boochani (2019) wrote, “In fact, Manus Prison is a 
pure version of a system which is emptying Man from identity, human freedoms and 
individuality” (para. 14). Surprisingly, he stands for a realistic picture of the ideologic 
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attempts to empty the individual’s self and to offer the illusionary idealized objects in 
the framework of the encapsulated skin-ego. It means anti-immigrant policies try 
intentionally to create a depersonalization state in refugees to push them to return to 
their homeland. Boochani explained how Manus is a human experiment of repressed 
ideologic policies of Australian government immigration to send skin-ego to the 
isolated corner and invoke encapsulated skin-ego to produce helplessness among 
refugees: 
 
You can see clearly that the most vulnerable people of society have been ignored. 
The system is designed in a particular way to treat their fellow beings and each 
other in a ruthless manner and they have been educated as robots indifferent to the 
suffering of others. (para. 17) 
 
Ideologic systems, then, are machines organized to break the individual’s spirit with 
the help of a perverse formula of torture which is deprival in its nature. Ultimately, a 
sick refugee can do nothing other than search for his name on waiting lists, but no one 
ever receives medical care. In fact, this is all very well-planned, and after persevering 
through countless trouble and stressful situations, the refugee experiences the full 
force of this perverse form of torture (Boochani, 2018a, 2019). The nature of ideology 
as a mass product of the encapsulated skin-ego is given control over the skin-ego and 
generates more traumatic experiences to overwhelm sensations to block following 
perceptions, such as the thinking ego. The result of this organized sabotage ideologic 
system is disturbed symbol formation and limited secondary process thought, which 
are represented in restricted usage of language. Slavoj Žižek (2002) explained this 
alexithymia, disability in emotional awareness, very well: “We ‘feel free’ because we 
lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom” (p. 2). 
 
Manus Island itself is regarded as a very exact symbol of an encapsulated unwanted 
cyst over the skin of Australian democracy and a capsule into which refugees are 
forcefully pushed which makes confined people inside it end up committing a suicide, 
being addicted to drugs and finally dying of not being provided with critical medical 
care, despite the fact that doctors are within an easy reach of them. 
 
Boochani exemplified well living the skin-ego under the epidermal repression of the 
encapsulated skin-ego as he tried to connect his repressed skin-ego by text messaging 
his writings via WhatsApp to a translator. He won the Victorian Prize for Literature as 
a result. Consequently, within the context of encapsulated skin-ego, the individual 
experiences ideology as a wound and makes an attempt in curing this wound through 
“bringing the two edges of the wound closer together [that] may involve elaboration, 
thinking, creation, culture, and humanization” (Jacobson, 1946, pp. 108-119). 
Conclusion 
A competition is evident among id, skin-ego, and superego to occupy the surface and 
to be the psychic wrapping for the psyche. The superego has two types of functioning. 
First, when the primal skin functions well and the superego helps skin-ego and 
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thinking ego to operate normally, the functioning is based on the acoustic nature of 
superego and word-presentation. Second, when the skin-ego is dysfunctional and 
cannot wrap the psyche, then the malignant superego in company with the skin-ego’s 
failures, and sometimes over using its functions, tries to dominate over the skin-ego 
and fill the emptied and deserted self through negative attachment, defective 
identifications and omnipotent phantasies. Considering the superego wishes to be a 
psychic envelope and regresses to its idea’s origins, the authors named this type of 
wrapping and patching the encapsulated skin-ego to show the regulating character of 
superego to regulate thoughts and affects instead of the ego. 
 
In conclusion, the core of the encapsulated skin-ego is functioning as a psychic 
wrapping instead of the skin-ego to provide an illusionary skin to protect the self. As a 
result, ideology as an isolative and phony configuration is a “lazyish” solution to fill 
the empty self of a group of people or nation through mass-producing prosocial but 
anti-individual leaders and shared systems of idealized ideas. This paper discussed the 
theoretical argument with the help of two cases. The first comprised psychoanalytic 
deep interview with an interviewee who had imprisonment experience, and the second 
was Behrouz Boochani’s book (2018b) that explained his experience as an imprisoned 
refugee on Manus Island. In both cases, the encapsulated skin-ego attempted to 
encapsulate the skin-ego and gain control over the psyche. In addition, the ideological 
discourse wanted to manipulate the encapsulated skin-ego of these two cases to break 
their spirits to acquire control over their minds and bodies. The discussion explained 
how the ideological machinery system designs white and perverse tortures to recall 
the encapsulated skin-ego to implant their illusionary idealized objects pathologically 
and govern a magical linguistic cognitive distortion instead of the thinking ego. It 
remains, however, debatable to apply this contribution to other analytic topics such as 
clinical cases, mythic and religious areas of theoretical investigation. 
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